UCMJ Article 98 Noncompliance with Procedural Rules vs Article 92 Failure to Obey Order: Judicial Process Violations vs General Disobedience
On this page: 7 sections
The label “Article 98 noncompliance” is out of date. Since January 1, 2019, the offense of noncompliance with procedural rules has been Article 131f; Article 98 now covers misconduct as a prisoner in enemy hands. Article 131f reaches people whose duties tie them to a case, when they cause unnecessary delay in it or knowingly and intentionally fail to follow the UCMJ’s rules for proceedings. Article 92 punishes any violation of a lawful order or regulation, and dereliction of duty.
The text of each article
(1) is responsible for unnecessary delay in the disposition of any case of a person accused of an offense under this chapter; or
(2) knowingly and intentionally fails to enforce or comply with any provision of this chapter regulating the proceedings before, during, or after trial of an accused;
Source: 10 U.S.C. § 931f (Article 131f), renumbered from § 898 by Pub. L. 114-328, § 5401(3), effective January 1, 2019.
(1) violates or fails to obey any lawful general order or regulation;
(2) having knowledge of any other lawful order issued by a member of the armed forces, which it is his duty to obey, fails to obey the order; or
(3) is derelict in the performance of his duties;
Source: 10 U.S.C. § 892 (Article 92).
Who can commit Article 131f
Both articles begin “Any person subject to this chapter.” Article 131f narrows itself through its elements. For delay, the Manual for Courts-Martial requires that the accused was charged with a duty in connection with disposing of the case, knew of that duty, and was responsible for delay that was unnecessary under the circumstances (MCM, Part IV, ¶ 87.b(1)). It adds that a person “may be responsible for delay in the disposition of a case only when that person’s duties require action with respect to the disposition of that case” (¶ 87.c(1)).
For the second clause, the accused must have had the duty to enforce or comply with the provision, known of the duty, and failed intentionally (¶ 87.b(2)). The Manual states that this clause “does not apply to errors made in good faith before, during, or after trial” (¶ 87.c(2)).
The statute does not name job titles. Whether a commander, a legal office, an investigator, or another official held the duty in a given case is a fact the government has to prove.
Unlawful command influence
The Manual gives one named use of Article 131f: “Unlawful command influence under Article 37 may be prosecuted under this Article” (¶ 87.c(2)). Article 37 bars a convening authority or commander from censuring, reprimanding, or admonishing the court, the military judge, members, or counsel about the findings or sentence or any other exercise of their functions in the proceeding, bars them from deterring potential witnesses, and bars any person subject to the UCMJ from attempting to coerce or, by unauthorized means, influence the action of a court-martial or its members in reaching findings or sentence, or the action of a convening, approving, or reviewing authority or preliminary hearing officer (10 U.S.C. § 837(a)(1)-(3)).
How Article 92 differs
Article 92 is not tied to court-martial procedure. It covers three separate offenses, each with its own knowledge rule (MCM, Part IV, ¶ 18):
| Offense | Knowledge requirement |
|---|---|
| Violating a lawful general order or regulation, 92(1) | Knowledge "is not an element of this offense and a lack of knowledge does not constitute a defense" (¶ 18.c(1)(d)) |
| Failing to obey another lawful order, 92(2) | Actual knowledge of the order is required; it may be proved circumstantially (¶ 18.c(2)(b)) |
| Dereliction of duty, 92(3) | The accused knew or reasonably should have known of the duties (¶ 18.b(3)(b)) |
General orders are those published by the President, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security, or a military department secretary, or issued throughout a command by an officer with general court-martial jurisdiction, a general or flag officer in command, or a superior commander (¶ 18.c(1)(a)). A duty for dereliction purposes may come from a treaty, statute, regulation, lawful order, standard operating procedure, or custom of the service (¶ 18.c(3)(a)).
Where the two articles overlap
A procedural duty can also be an ordered duty. Take, as a hypothetical, an official responsible for forwarding charges who sits on them without reason after being told to act. The delay can support an Article 131f specification if the duty concerned disposing of the case. The same facts can be framed as dereliction under Article 92(3), which requires only that the accused knew or reasonably should have known of the duty and was derelict through willfulness, neglect, or culpable inefficiency.
The mental states differ. Article 131f(2) requires a knowing and intentional failure and excludes good-faith error. Article 92(3) includes negligent dereliction. Which article fits depends on the duty involved and the evidence of intent. Whether a given delay was “unnecessary,” who in a particular command held the duty, and whether conduct amounts to unlawful command influence are decided in the case itself, by the military judge on motions or by the court-martial on the facts.
Maximum punishments
| Offense | Maximum |
|---|---|
| Unnecessary delay in disposing of a case, 131f(1) | Bad-conduct discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, 6 months (MCM ¶ 87.d(1)) |
| Knowingly and intentionally failing to enforce or comply, 131f(2) | Dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, 5 years (¶ 87.d(2)) |
| Violating a lawful general order or regulation | Dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, 2 years (¶ 18.d(1)) |
| Failing to obey another lawful order | Bad-conduct discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, 6 months (¶ 18.d(2)) |
| Dereliction through neglect or culpable inefficiency | Confinement for 3 months and forfeiture of two-thirds pay per month for 3 months (¶ 18.d(3)(a)) |
| The same, resulting in death or grievous bodily harm | Bad-conduct discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, 18 months (¶ 18.d(3)(b)) |
| Willful dereliction | Bad-conduct discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, 6 months (¶ 18.d(3)(c)) |
| Willful dereliction resulting in death or grievous bodily harm | Dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, 2 years (¶ 18.d(3)(d)) |
The Manual limits the Article 92 order maximums in two situations: if, without the order, the same facts would support another specific offense with a lesser punishment, or if the violation is a breach of restraint imposed by an order. In those cases the maximum is the one prescribed for that specific offense (¶ 18.d, note). Where every finding of guilty is for an offense committed after December 27, 2023, the sentence in a general or special court-martial is set by the military judge, except in a capital case (10 U.S.C. § 853(b)(1)).
Sources
- 10 U.S.C. § 931f, noncompliance with procedural rules (Article 131f)
- 10 U.S.C. § 892, failure to obey order or regulation (Article 92)
- 10 U.S.C. § 837, command influence (Article 37)
- Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2024 edition), Part IV, ¶ 18 and ¶ 87.
This is general information about Articles 131f and 92; it does not assess any official’s conduct in a real case. This page reflects the UCMJ as amended through Public Law 119-60 (December 18, 2025) and the Manual for Courts-Martial (2024 edition) as amended by Executive Order 14130.